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February 1967] Recent Developments 
SECURITIES-Purchaser of Outstanding Shares of 
Same Class as Registered Issue Cannot Bring 
Snit Under Section 11 (a) of Securities Act 
--Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.* 
795 
Pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933,1 defendant-
seller filed a registration statement covering a large issue of deben-
tures and the common stock issuable upon their conversion.2 
Through a series of purchases on the open market beginning four 
months after this filing, plaintiff acquired a large amount of defen-
dant's outstanding common stock. Subsequently, the market value 
of the common stock dropped and plaintiff sustained a considerable 
loss on its investment. Although it conceded that it had not pur-
chased any of the shares converted from the registered issue of 
debentures, plaintiff instituted a suit for damages3 claiming, inter 
alia, that alleged material misstatements in the registration state-
ment gave it a right to recover under section 11 of the Securities 
Act, 4 which provides in relevant part that: 
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part 
became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact 
or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or 
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person 
acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such 
acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, ... sue .... " 
[Emphasis added.] 
On defendants' motion for summary judgment, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed plain-
tiff's claim. The use of the words "such security" in section ll(a) of 
• 257 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (hereinafter referred to as principal case]. 
I. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964). Section 5, 68 Stat. 684 
(1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964), makes it unlawful to issue securities through the mails 
or interstate commerce unless a registration statement is in effect, except as a particular 
issue or transaction might be exempt from registration by § 3, 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1964), or § 4, 78 Stat. 580 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1964). 
Section 7, 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964), deals with the information required 
in the registration statement. 
2. The registration statement covered an issue of $25,634,400 of debentures as well 
as any common stock which would be converted therefrom. At the time the present suit 
was instituted, only 209 shares of common stock had been converted from the debentures. 
3. l3etween May 2, 1961, and August 6, 1962, the plaintiff acquired over 30,000 
shares of the outstanding common stock at a purchase price of over $1,600,000. The 
alleged loss in value was over $1,000,000. 
4. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964). The claim under § 11 was 
the first count of a 39-count complaint; trial on the other counts is still pending. The 
other claims were made under the 1933 Act §§ 12, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 
U.S.C. § 771 (1964); 17, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964); the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9, 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964); lO(b), 
48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964); 15, 49 Stat. 1377 (1936), as amended, 15 
U.S.C. § 780 (1964); 18, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964); and the 
common law. 
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the Securities Act limits the applicability of that section to securities 
which are, in fact, issued under the registration statement: the sec-
tion does not cover unregistered securities even if they are of the 
same class. 
The court in the principal case conceded that, as a matter of eco-
nomic reality, the prospectus (which contained the alleged misstate-
ment) affects, because of its wide circulation, the value of the shares 
outstanding at the time it is distributed, as well as that of the new 
issue which is the subject of the registration statement. Indeed, finan-
cial institutions, market experts, brokers, and dealers digest and 
analyze the prospectus, and their opinions inevitably affect market 
values of all outstanding stock.6 However, in light of the act's legis-
lative history, its general scheme of regulation, and the language 
contained in its other provisions, the court was compelled to deny 
the plaintiff's cause of action. 
The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted to regulate the marketing 
of specific issues of securities. It requires comprehensive registration 
in order to assure a complete, honest, and competent disclosure of 
the nature and value of securities being offered to the public. The 
act, however, was not intended to regulate the trading of outstand-
ing securities.6 When the House bill which was to become the 1933 
Act was presented to Congress in substantially its final form, the 
scope of its civil liability provisions was described as entitling 
5. "These arguments have the sound ring of economic reality but unfortunately 
they merely point up the problems involved in the present scheme of statutory 
regulation." Principal case at 881. There can be no dispute that the information appear-
ing in the registration statement may have a profound economic effect on holders of 
all outstanding securities. For a judicial recognition of this fact, cf. Columbia Gen. 
Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 265 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1959), affirming the SEC's issuance of a stop 
order against the effectiveness of a misleading registration statement over the issuer's 
contention that such order could not issue if the registrant desired to withdraw the 
statement voluntarily since such withdrawal was of no concern to anyone other than 
the registrant. 
6. In the words of James M. Landis, one of the draftsmen of the House bill, who 
later served as SEC chairman, "throughout, its patent concern was primarily with the 
flow of securities from the issuer through underwriters to the public rather than with 
the subsequent buying and selling of the securities by the public." Landis, The 
Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 36 (1959). 
Regulation of trading in outstanding securities was one of the basic purposes of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Generally, the 1934 Act contemplates continuous 
registration of an entire class of outstanding stock through periodic filing of reports 
under § 12, 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964), and § 13, 48 Stat. 
894 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964). The express civil liabilities which the 
1934 Act creates generally run only against the issuer and persons controlling the 
issuing corporation and involve very difficult matters of proof. Therefore, a buyer in 
the present plaintiff's shoes has a much less effective remedy under the 1934 Act than 
he would have under the 1933 Act if the court in the principal case had upheld his 
claim. For an excellent analysis and discussion of the interrelationship of the 1933 and 
1934 Acts and their frequently overlapping and inconsistent disclosure requirements, 
see Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340 (1966), which also 
contains sweeping proposals for a more coordinated system of federal securities regula-
tion which would incorporate the more effective aspects of both Acts. 
February 1967] Recent Developments 797 
". . . the buyer of registered securities sold upon a registration state-
ment including an untrue statement or omission of material fact, to 
sue . . . .''7 Since its enactment, commentators have assumed that, 
in view of the act's restrictive purpose, its remedial provisions are 
to be interpreted narrowly.8 
Moreover, the basic structure of the act9 leaves little doubt that 
Congress intended to limit strictly the civil liability which flows 
from non-compliance with its provisions. Procedural obstacles have 
been placed in the paths of would-be plaintiffs so as to limit the po-
tentially great liability which might otherwise be incurred. Indeed, 
the possibility that the court would require the plaintiff to under-
take the cost of the suit coupled with the generally heavy litigation 
expense involved therein and a short statute of limitations applica-
ble to section 11 actions tend to discourage litigation of even sub-
stantively sound claims.10 These obstacles are evidence of the fact 
that the primary purpose underlying the imposition of liability 
7. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933). 
The bill affects only new offerings of securities sold through the use of the mails 
or of instrumentalities of interstate or foreign transportation or communication. 
It does not affect the ordinary redistribution of securities unless such redistribution 
takes on the characteristics of a new offering by reason of the control of the issuer 
possessed by those responsible for the offering. 
Id. at 5. (Emphasis added.) 
8. E.g., 3 Loss, SECURITIES R.EcuLATION 1731 n.160 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss) 
("Presumably, however, the open-market buyer must be able to trace his particular 
securities to the registration statement when it covered additional securities of an 
outstanding class''); Cohen, supra note 6, at 1340, 1341, 1355-74; Flanagin, The Federal 
Securities Act and the Locked-in Stockholder, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 1141 (1965); 
Painter, Civil Liabilities and Administrative Sanctions Under the Securities Act of 
1933, 34 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 185 (1966); Schulman, Civil Liability and the Securi-
ties Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933); Comment, Civil Liability for Misstatements in Docu-
ments Filed Under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44 YALE L.J. 456 (1935). 
9. For summaries of the scope of the 1933 Act, see, e.g., Douglas &: Bates, The 
Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933); Halleran &: Calderwood, Effect 
of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and Trading in Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 86 (1959); Reinoehl, Basic Pattern and Coverage of the 1933 Act, 34 U. Mo. KAN. 
CITY L. REv. 172 (1966); and authorities cited note 8 supra. 
10. Section ll(e) gives the coun the authority to require, at its discretion, an under-
taking for the costs of the suit, including attorney's fees. A summary or direced judg-
ment may be the ground for a similar assessment of costs, should the court believe the 
suit to have been without merit. Generally, the costs incurred in obtaining the necessary 
matters of proof are extremely heavy, and there is a general tendency to avoid throwing 
good money after bad when an investment loss has been incurred. Cf. Fox v. Glickman 
Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. (Transfer Binder 1964-1966) 1J 91682 (S.D.N.Y. May. 3, 
1966); Dabny v. Allegheny Corp., 164 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Montague v. Electronic 
Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
Section 13, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964), provides that no 
action may be maintained under either §§ II or 12 unless it is brought within one 
year after the discovery of the untrue statement or omission, and in no case more 
than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public. See, e.g., Shonts 
v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 
707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); M. J. Hall &: Co. v. Johnson, 92 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
But see Escott v. Barchriss Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965). 
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under the 1933 Act is to produce an in terrorem or deterrent effect.11 
Since the act is not primarily concerned with recovery, there is no 
apparent reason for reading section 11 so as to provide compensation 
to anyone who may have suffered a loss which is traceable to the 
seller's misrepresentation. The court in the principal case admitted 
that to give a right of recovery to only those purchasers who for-
tuitously acquired shares from a particular registered issue while 
denying that same right to those who happened to buy completely 
fungible but unregistered shares on the open market is indeed an 
arbitrary distinction when viewed from the standpoint of compensa-
tion for market losses due to false registration; a distortion of the 
financial condition of the defendant-seller inflates the market value 
of its stock and the later, inevitable drop in price results in a loss to 
anyone holding that stock, regardless of whether it is stock which 
happened to be the subject of the registration statement alleged to 
have precipitated the market decline. Nevertheless, and in spite of 
the appeal to one's sense of equity of a right to compensation for 
anyone holding adversely affected shares, the arbitrary limits on the 
remedy provided in section 11 may be justified if the paramount 
purpose of the provisions is penal rather than compensatory.12 And, 
the penal nature of the provision is demonstrated by the fact, dis-
11. See, e.g., Note, 72 YALE L.J. 406, 410 (1962), which asserts that insurance agree• 
ments indemnifying underwriters run counter to the 1933 Act's basic policy of holding 
great personal liability over the heads of those responsible for the truthfulness and 
competence of the registration statement. Shulman, supra note 8, states that: 
It is not the object of the Act simply to provide a legal remedy for the investor 
who has bought securities upon a false representation, to compensate him for a 
loss incurred. Even the provisions for civil liability are calculated to be largely 
preventive rather than redressive. 
Id. at 227; cf. Wogahn v. Stevens, 236 Wis. 122, 294 N.W. 503 (1940), characterizing § 11 
as penal rather than remedial in nature, and therefore holding that the cause of action 
which it creates is unassignable. 
12. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). This 
case demonstrates that the arbitrary nature of a remedy is irrelevant where the 
underlying rationale for the providing of the remedy is, in the first instance, to 
effect a penal sanction. The SEC complaint demanded relief in the form of an 
order compelling the insider defendants to offer recission and/or restitution to 
the person or persons from whom each of these defendants purchased stock and 
options or calls to purchase the company's stock during the period in which the 
defendants had information as to the value of the stock, which information had 
not yet been made public. From the standpoint of granting relief for investment 
injuries, the SEC proposal is clearly arbitrary; the very limited class of sellers who 
would be permitted to recover in such a situation had wholly personal reasons for 
deciding to sell their Texas Gulf holdings when they did. The mere fortuity that their 
stock was purchased by one of the defendant-insiders would not seem to give them 
a more equitable claim than that of any of the other Texas Gulf shareholders who 
happened to sell during the period of insider manipulation. This is clearly a case of 
using private compensation for a penal purpose and is a more extreme example of 
arbitrariness than that which is the result of the narrow interpretation of § 11 in the 
principal case. Indeed, in the principal case, the plaintiff is denied recovery although 
it has suffered a loss attributable to the alleged misrepresentations of the defendant 
whereas recovery in Texas Gulf would result in a windfall for the compensated parties. 
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cussed above, that Congress intended the provisions to serve as a 
deterrent. 
The fact that liability may exist under section 11 without regard 
to whether the issuer acted in bad faith is an additional argument 
for limiting the scope of that section. In the principal case, for ex-
ample, to hold that the issuing corporation is liable, for uninten-
tional misrepresentations, to each of the holders of the more than 
16,000,000 outstanding shares of the defendant's common stock is 
to extract a rather large price for mere negligence. But, this would, 
in fact, be the logical result of expanding section 11 to admit the 
plaintiff's claim. The 1933 Act should not be interpreted to allow 
such a devastating result since its purpose was not simply to protect 
the purchaser of securities, but to do so "with the least possible in-
terference to honest business."13 There has been only a handful of 
suits brought under section 11,14 and yet it has been established that 
the act has produced a considerably high quality of disclosure;15 
arguably this indicates that unlimited liability is not necessary for 
section 11 to be an effective sanction. 
Furthermore, the language of other portions of the 1933 Act 
supports a restrictive reading of section 11. For example, section 
6(a), which stipulates which signatures are to appear on the regis-
tration statement (and upon which signatures section 11 liability 
may be predicated), provides that the registration statement shall 
be effective only as to the specific issue of securities which it purports 
to cover.16 Although this requirement is primarily designed to assure 
that new and separate statements will be filed for later issues, and 
13. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933). 
14. See generally 3 Loss 1683-92, for an extensive compilation of suits brought 
under the 1933 Act and an analysis of factors which account for the scarcity of ad-
judicated claims and recoveries. It should be noted, however, that one reason for the 
scarcity of § 11 litigation would seem to be the likelihood of out-of-court settlement 
where a § 11 claim appears to be substantively well-founded, since the virtually strict 
liability of the offending issuer tends to discourage the contesting of such an accusation. 
15. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 6, at 1355: 
In actual experience however, instances of liability have been remarkably few; 
instead, the liability provisions have had the in terrorem effect of creating an 
extraordinarily high sense of care and responsibility in the preparation of registra-
tion statements. 
16. 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1964), provides, subsequent to setting forth 
the procedure for filing a registration statement, that "a registration statement shall be 
deemed effective only as to the securities specified therein as proposed to be offered." 
Section 4(3)(A), 78 Stat. 580 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3)(A) (1964), is only consistent 
with the restricting of § ll(a) to registered shares. It forces a dealer to differentiate 
between shares newly issued and shares outstanding by requiring him to deliver a 
prospectus as part of any open market transaction in new shares during a 40-day 
period subsequent to their initial public offering. 
Rule 413, 17 C.F.R. § 230.413 (1964), provides that: 
the registration of additional securities of the same class as other securities for 
which a registration statement is already in effect shall be effected through a 
separate registration statement relating to the additional securities. 
To the same effect, see Rule 416, 17 C.F.R. § 230.416 (1964). 
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although it does not expressly purport to limit liability for a single 
misleading statement, it is difficult to reconcile this provision with 
the theory that the registration of a single issue may be the basis of 
liability for losses incurred on an entire class of outstanding securi-
ties. 
Finally, judicial precedent offers an additional, although some-
what weaker, source of authority for the court's holding in the prin-
cipal case. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.17 is the only prior case 
which makes specific mention of the class of plaintiffs entitled to 
recover under section 11.18 In that case, holders of common stock 
(stock not converted from preferred) brought an action alleging a 
section 11 violation. The basis of their suit was a misleading regis-
tration statement which covered an issue of preferred stock and the 
common stock to which it was convertible. The section 11 claim was 
abandoned before adjudication; nonetheless, on appeal, the Second 
Circuit said: 
A suit under § 11 of the 1933 Act requires no proof of fraud or 
deceit, and such a suit may be maintained only by one who comes 
within a narrow class of persons, i.e. those who purchase securities 
that are the direct subject of the prospectus and registration statement 
(here the purchasers of preferred stock).19 
The validity of this statement has gone unchallenged, but it must 
be recognized that it is mere dicta. 
Although there is little doubt that the court reached the proper 
result in the principal case, its restrictive construction of section 11 
does raise some tangential questions with respect to the effectiveness 
and integrated application of the scheme of civil remedies created 
by the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Recently, concern has been engendered 
by the general judicial liberality in implying remedies to supplement 
17. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), reversing on other grounds 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 
1949). 
18. See also Barnes v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Rudnick v. 
Franchard Corp., 237 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
19. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951) (Emphasis 
added.) However, the issue of the scope of the class of plaintiffs to be compensated 
under § 11 was in no way before the Fischman court. Its holding, in fact, did no more 
than imply a remedy for the plaintiffs under § IO(b) of the 1934 Act; and the 
language concerning § 11 's scope should be read as an effort to strengthen, by showing 
a lack of alternative remedies, their ultimate conclusion that a § IO(b) recovery was 
necessary and proper. 
Two cases have purported to base holdings on the Fischman case, but neither are 
on point factually. The Rudnick case, supra note 18, was a summary dismissal of a 
§ 11 suit against an underwriter of a first issue of stock only, where plaintiff had 
purchased stock which was the subject of a second issue. The holding was seemingly 
based on a failure to show reliance where intervening financial information is avail-
able. The Barnes case, supra note 18, was a judicial approval of a stipulation of con-
sent and agreement settlement of a § 11 suit. An objection by an outstanding share-
holder to the terms of the settlement which limited recovery to those who had acquired 
shares identifiable to the registered issue was dismissed solely on the basis of the 
Fischman dicta. 
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those which are expressly provided.2° Consequently, the question 
arises as to the propriety of implying a remedy under other sections 
of the Securities Acts for a plaintiff who is properly denied relief 
under section 11.21 It can be forcefully argued that, since section 11 
expressly deals with registration misstatement situations and is the 
broadest provision for recovery in this area,22 a plaintiff who fails 
to come under its protection was not intended to have another rem-
edy and none should be implied in his behalf. The breadth of the 
provision is evidenced by the fact that section 11 does not require 
elements of proof or relationships between the litigants which are 
necessary under other provisions relied upon by the plaintiff. For 
example, under the 1933 Act, section 12(1) imposes civil liability 
only upon those who have sold unregistered securities in violation 
of section 5,23 and section 12(2), which imposes liability on those 
selling securities (regardless of whether they are required to be 
registered) by means of a prospectus or oral communication contain-
ing an untruth or omission of material fact, contains a privity re-
quirement. 24 Moreover, under the 1934 Act,25 section 9(e) recovery 
20. A discussion of the remedies implied from § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q{a) (1964), under the 1933 Act and § IO(b), 48 Stat. 891 
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), as implemented by Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 
(1964), is not intended to extend beyond the noting of their existence and the fact 
that the principal case discusses rule lOb-5 as the basis of a possible remedy for the 
present plaintiff. See notes 28 &: 32 infra and accompanying text. 
21. Cf. note 4 supra, citing other sections of the Securities Acts which have been 
pleaded in the present case. 
22. One of the purposes of the civil liability provisions of the 1933 Act was to 
broaden the action of common law deceit. Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818, 819 (3d 
Cir. 1941). For an early analysis of the specific ways in which § 11 is an improvement 
over common law recovery, see Note, 38 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1103 (1940). See generally 3 
Loss 1682-92, 1721-42. Liability under § 11 is imposed jointly and severally upon 
different classes of defendants responsible in various ways for the truth of the 
registration statement. As to the issuer of the securities, liability is virtually absolute 
if the statement is shown to contain a material misstatement or omission; neither 
privity, reliance, nor scienter is a requisite element of the plaintiff's case. Section ll(a) 
provides that suit may be brought against: 
(1) every person who signed the registration statement; (2) every person who was 
a director of (or person performing similar functions) or partner in, the issuer 
at the time of the filing of the part of the registration statement with respect to 
which his liability is asserted; (3) every person who, with his consent, is named 
in the registration statement as being or about to become a director, person per• 
forming similar functions, or partner; (4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, 
or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who 
has with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the 
registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation 
which is used in connection with the registation statement, with respect to the 
statement in such registration statement, report or valuation, which purports to 
have been prepared or certified by him; (5) every underwriter with respect to such 
security. 
23. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1964). 
24. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964). This section contem• 
plates only a suit by a buyer against the immediate seller, typically the dealer who 
made the sale. But "controlling persons" under § 15 may possibly also be held liable. 
However, such suit would, practically speaking, also require proof of scienter. See 
generally 3 Loss 1699-1721. 
25. Cf. note 6 supra. 
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is predicated upon proof of a willful misstatement and proof that 
such misstatement actually caused the securities to drop in value,26 
while section 18(a) requires, in addition, proof that the plaintiff re-
lied upon the misstatement.27 Since these requirements of willfulness, 
causation, and reliance impose an almost impossible burden of proof 
on any plaintiff, it is not surprising to find a dearth of litigation 
under these latter two sections. This is not to suggest that, because 
neither the 1933 nor the 1934 Act provides a substitute remedy in 
cases where section 11 is not applicable, the court in the principal 
case should have construed that section so as to permit plaintiff 
to recover. Nor should it move the court to imply a substitute remedy. 
However, the fact is that other courts have already significantly 
expanded civil remedies for investment injuries beyond the restricted 
rights of action expressly provided by Congress, by implying a right 
of action for both injured purchasers and sellers of securities under 
section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act.28 The rule simply de-
clares "unlawful" any fraudulent scheme or misrepresentation effec• 
tuated through interstate commerce.29 The implied right of action 
under the rule has been held to be concurrent with the express pro-
visions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,30 but is not subject to their proce-
26. 48 Stat. 890 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964). This section deals with specific 
prohibitions against manipulation of prices of securities registered on a national 
securities exchange, and the liability runs in favor of anyone who has purchased or 
sold a security at a price affected by the prohibited acts or transactions. See generally 
3 Loss 1747-51. 
27. 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964). This section imposes 
liability for filing any false or misleading statement, report, or document pursuant 
to the provisions of the Act. See generally 3 Loss 1751-54. 
28. See note 20 supra. Among the many excellent discussions and analyses of Rule 
10b-5's impact on securities regulation and civil liability are: Klein, The Extension of a 
Private Remedy to Defrauded Securities Investors Under SEC Rule I0b-5, 20 U. MIAMI 
L. REv. 81 (1965); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule I0b-5: Judicial Revision of 
Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963); Simpson, Investors' Civil Remedies 
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 12 DE PAULL. REv. 71 (1962). 
The classic analysis of the many anomalies presented by the judicial implication 
of remedies which would not otherwise exist under the scheme of federal securities 
regulation is by Professor Loss, 3 Loss 1778-97. 
29. The rule provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange, 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
30. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), was the landmark 
decision giving the buyer a remedy under rule l0b-5. That case held that it was 
necessary to allege fraud in addition to the material misstatement which is the basis 
of a § 11 action. However, later cases have considerably undermined the concept of 
fraud, bringing it closer to the language of clause (2) of the rule, note 29 supra. It 
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dural and substantive restrictions.31 Consistent with the recent judi-
cial trend, the court in the principal case indicated that the mis-
statements and omissions in the registration statement filed by de-
fendants might well constitute the quasi-fraud required for recovery 
under rule IOb-5.32 Whether plaintiff may ultimately recover on the 
basis of this implied right of action is not known at the present time, 
and no attempt to predict the matters of proof that might be required 
of it or the extent of its possible recovery thereunder will be under-
should be noted that his language bears a striking resemblance to that which describes 
actionable conduct under § ll(a). See, e.g., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers 
Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14, 23 (W.D. Ky. 1960), which states: 
A plaintiff purchaser need only prove that a statement in a prospectus or oral 
communication is in fact false or is a misleading omission and that he did not 
know of such untruth or omission. 
Note, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1070 (1965), examines the holding of Trussell v. United Under-
writers, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964), as representative of a growing number 
of decisions permitting a buyer's suit under rule lOb-5, including suit for alleged mis-
statements and omissions under clause (2) of the rule, note 29 supra. 
31. See note 10 supra, setting forth the strict requirements of the statute of linlita-
tions and the undertaking for costs under § 11. See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th 
Cir. 1961), for an excellent discussion of the unavoidable clash between the various 
restrictions which are placed on the remedies expressly created by Congress and the 
negation of these restrictions by a remedy implied under rule lOb-5. 
Section 11 has previously been circumvented by the lOb-5 route to the extent that 
the statute of limitations requirement has been negated by a proceeding under rule 
!Ob-5 which is controlled by the typically longer state statute of limitations. Fischman 
v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). Indeed this is the anomaly of the 
implied right of recovery for the injured buyer under the rule, i.e., when conduct 
which is actionable under § 11 of the 1933 Act becomes actionable under rule lOb-5, 
there is a circumvention of the restrictive conditions under which the buyer's suit was 
intended to be conducted. Sinlilarly, the rule undermines the same restrictions which 
are also incident to § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Trussel v. United Undenvriters, Ltd., 
supra note 30, is a good recent example of the trend toward accepting the inherent 
anomalies involved in applying rule !Ob-5 to conduct otherwise actionable under the 
more restrictive provisions of the 1933 Act. 
Since the decision in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., supra, numerous other cases 
have recognized the right of a "defrauded" buyer to sue under rule 10b·5 free of the 
restrictions imposed by the 1933 Act. See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 
F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Matheson v. 
Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Ellis v. Carter, supra; Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall 
Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers 
Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960); Greenwich Sav. Bank v. Shields, 131 F. 
Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
32. But terms such as "fraud" and "deceit" appearing in the Investment Advisor's 
Act of 1940 have been construed by the Supreme Court in accordance with the 
legislative purpose which was to "substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the 
philosophy of caveat emptor . . . ." S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) •... The Court made it clear, in reversing an en bane 
decision of this Circuit, that the underlying legislative purpose was equally 
applicable to the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, ... and that the term "fraud" 
~hould not be construed in the early common law technical sense. Rather the 
tendency of later cases ... was to merge the "proscription against non-disclosure 
into the general proscription against fraud, treating the former, in effect, as one 
variety of the latter." 
The exhibits introduced on this motion seem to lend some support to the plaintiff's 
allegation of nondisclosure or suppression of information material to an evaluation. 
Principal case at 882. 
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taken.33 However, the court, in summarizing its analysis of matters 
which were not before it for adjudication, indicated its position on 
the plaintiff's ultimate chance of success as follows: 
Although Section 11 would be the simplest to satisfy it hardly follows 
that plaintiff will be denied an effective remedy by being precluded 
from proceeding on Count One [the Section 11 claim], only, of its 
complaint.34 
The anomaly of the court's strictly adhering to congressional intent 
in considering and rejecting the section 11 claim while simultane-
ously suggesting the strong possibility of success on a judicially 
created and expanded remedy without regard to congressional intent 
may presage an expansion of rule I0b-5 which would significantly 
undermine the rationale on which the actual holding of the present 
case is based. Should plaintiff ultimately recover under rule I 0b-5 
to an extent approximating that which he unavailingly claimed 
under section 11, a precedent would be established for future judicial 
circumvention of section 11. Moreover, as mentioned above, the 
resulting broad liability would not be subject to the procedural safe-
guards which surround section 11 causes of action.35 
Thus, the narrow construction which was placed upon section 11 
by the court in the principal case may, ironically, provide the im-
petus for judicial extension of rule 1 0b-5 so as to impose liability as 
severe as that which was rejected in the first instance. Section 11 
would remain the most effective source of recovery in those situations 
to which it clearly applies-misstatements in registered issues-but 
the expansion of the application of rule I 0b-5 into the area distinc-
tively defined both by the scope and the restrictions of section 11 
would seem to render those restrictions meaningless and, further, 
to call into question the integrity of the federal securities regulatory 
scheme. 
33. See Klein, supra note 28, at 99-108, discussing the still unsettled questions as to 
what elements of proof are required in a buyer's action under rule IOb-5. A recovery 
would seem to be possible without proof of privity, reliance, or scicnter. Klein states 
that in the light of the Supreme Court's apparent approval of the judicial expansion 
of rule IOb-5 in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963), the 
anomalies associated with the rule seem destined to persist absent a comprehensive 
reappraisal by Congress, and that it is entirely possible that, 
given a liberal construction, Rule l0b-5 would be broad enough to encompass 
every type of violation presently cognizable under the e.xprcss provisions of the 
two acts, while at the same time it would avoid the built-in restrictions and 
limitations contained in those provisions. Thus, for example, by the simple process 
of "characterization," a false or misleading registration statement, actionable under 
section 11 of the Securities Act, might be held to constitute a "scheme, or artifice 
to defraud" or an "untrue statement of a material fact" within Rule IOb-5. 
34. Principal case at 883. 
35. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. 
